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ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a new approach to Ageing Probabilistic Safety Assessment (APSA) mod-
elling, which is intended to be used to support risk-informed decisions on the effectiveness of maintenance 
management programs and technical specification requirements of critical equipment of Nuclear Power Plants 
(NPP) within the framework of the Risk Informed Decision Making according to R.G. 1.174 principles. This 
approach focuses on the incorporation of not only equipment ageing but also effectiveness of maintenance 
and efficiency of surveillance testing explicitly into APSA models and data. An example of application is pre-
sented, which centers on a critical safety-related equipment of a NPP in order to evaluate the risk impact of 
considering different approaches to APSA and the combined effect of equipment ageing and maintenance and 
testing alternatives along NPP design life. The risk impact of the several alternatives is quantified and the re-
sults shows that such risk depends largely on the model parameters, such as ageing factor, maintenance effec-
tiveness, test efficiency. 
Keywords: Risk, decision-making, ageing, PSA, asset management, design life management, life extension, 
long-term operation, maintenance, surveillance requirements, NPP equipment, periodic safety review. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
One of the main challenges for 2020 horizon is to maintain fission technologies competitiveness by research 
and technological development necessary in order to allow a safe Long Term Operation (LTO) of the nuclear 
reactors in operation nowadays (GEN II and III) [1-3]. For example, in 2020 most of the Nuclear Power 
Plants (NPP) in Spain, which are Light Water Reactor (LWR) type, would be operating for around 40 years, 
which is the plant design life, and they will face the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) to obtain, eventually, life 
extension approval for the LTO from the regulatory body (usually for 10 more years). 
During the design life, licensee of NPP must perform the necessary activities for ageing management of 
Structures, Systems and Components (SSC), which include consideration of measures for monitoring, control 
and mitigation of the mechanisms of physical ageing of SSC adopting the necessary maintenance in scope of 
asset management programs and surveillance testing activities within NPP technical specifications.  
An important part of PSR involves the evaluation of risk impact of how current life management of ageing 
equipment, e.g. maintenance and testing programs, is successful in achieving the objective of allowing a safe 
operation along NPP design life. In particular, PSR close to the end of the NPP design life should involve the 
evaluation of at least, but not only, how ageing management along NPP design life would jeopardize NPP 
safety for the extended period. In addition, if necessary, it should be also evaluated the effectiveness of adopt-
ing an alternative ageing management plan, e.g. maintenance policy, or even, studying the risk impact of 
changing technical specification requirements, such as surveillance requirements, for the extended life in or-
der to achieve the safety standards required to get approval from regulatory bodies for NPP long term opera-
tion. 
2 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND ITS APPLICATION 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) is an essential tool for assessing, maintaining, assuring and improving the 
NPP safety. Nowadays, PSA is an efficient tool for evaluation of risk impact of changes to licensing basis [4] 
and in particular to surveillance requirements of NPP technical specifications within the framework of the 
Risk Informed Decision Making (RIDM) according to R.G. 1.174 principles [5, 6].  
In a similar way, PSA can become also a relevant tool for the evaluation of the effectiveness of asset man-
agement programs from a risk viewpoint, e.g. searching for risk-efficient maintenance and testing programs 
of ageing equipment along NPP life (both design life and extended life). However, standard PSA does not ad-
dress adequately important ageing and maintenance and testing issues necessary for it to play such a relevant 
role. For example, current practice in PSA modelling considers constant failure rates instead of explicit age-
dependent failure rates of safety related equipment. In addition, they do not formulate explicitly how a large 
variety of surveillance, maintenance and inspection programs, which are intended to mitigate or at least keep 
under control the effects of equipment ageing, impact on failure rates. The extent to which components are 
susceptible to ageing differs considerably depending on the particular life management program (maintenance 
and testing) and its effectiveness along the operational life of the NPP.  
Therefore, adoption of standard PSA models and data that do not addresses explicitly neither the effect of 
equipment ageing nor maintenance and testing programs could have a significant impact on the conclusions 
drawn from PSA studies and applications, particularly when NPP are operated at an advanced age or during 
long term operation. Thus, equipment ageing and asset management contributions would most likely result in 
large uncertainty of current component unreliability and unavailability models that support standard PSA 
quantification, particularly for aged equipment. Fortunately, these effects are limited often implicitly by 
adopting a living PSA or at least updating the standard PSA regularly, which is mandatory by current regula-
tion in many countries. 
It seems more appropriate that PSA modelling and data addresses above issues explicitly, instead of ad-
dressing them only implicitly at the most. Such issues can be seen evolving from the component level to the 
plant level. So, component reliability models must be developed first to support the Ageing PSA (APSA) 
modelling, which must integrate consideration of the combined effect of component ageing, maintenance 
management and technical specification requirements at NPP. 
Pioneering work in this area started long time ago, which revealed the significance of equipment ageing 
what concerns PSA results and applications [7-11]. Nowadays, different approaches to Ageing PSA are being 
proposed to account for equipment ageing [12-14]. In this respect, lessons learnt on ageing assessment, mod-
elling and management of SSC of NPP in the framework of international programs and initiatives (NPAR, 
GALL, IGALL, etc.) should be fully integrated when applicable within APSA models and data [7, 15, 16]. 
In this paper, a new approach to Ageing PSA modelling is proposed, which incorporates the impact of not 
only equipment ageing but also maintenance and testing policies explicitly into PSA models and data, which 
is intended to be used in the framework of the Risk Informed Decision Making philosophy (R.G. 1.174) [4]. 
This APSA could be used to support risk-informed decisions on the effectiveness of maintenance programs 
and technical specification requirements of critical equipment of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP), for example 
adopting the methodology proposed in Refs. [5, 6]. 
3 EFFECTIVENESS OF MAINTENANCE AND TESTING 
Ref. [17] reviews briefly the role of maintenance and testing activities to achieve appropriate levels of relia-
bility, availability and safety of safety related equipment at NPP. It illustrates basic concepts in relation to 
natural reliability, reliability degradation (e.g. ageing as degradation mechanism), inherent reliability, main-
tainability (e.g. maintenance types such as preventive, corrective and overhaul maintenance), availability, 
maintenance effectiveness (e.g. imperfect maintenance) and testing effectiveness (e.g. failures covered by 
surveillance tests). It pays special attention to describe both positive and negative effects of maintenance and 
testing. 
 
3.1 Effectiveness of maintenance activities 
Maintenance represents all activities performed on equipment in order to assess, maintain or restore its opera-
tional capabilities. Maintenance introduces two types of positive aspects. Firstly, corrective maintenance re-
stores the operational capability of the failed or degraded equipment and secondly preventive maintenance in-
creases the intrinsic reliability of non-failed equipment beyond the natural reliability, for example, controlling 
its degradation below the failure point. Although the equipment is subjected to preventive and corrective 
maintenance it may degrade over age depending on the working conditions of the equipment and the effec-
tiveness of the maintenance being applied (so called imperfect maintenance). So that, several activities are 
scheduled to control evolution of degradation mechanisms that fall into the categories of continuous monitor-
ing or periodic predictive maintenance, which are responsible for launching on condition preventive or cor-
rective activities when necessary. 
On the contrary, maintenance also introduces adverse effects, called the downtime effect that represents the 
time the equipment is out of service to overcome maintenance (corrective, preventive, repair, overhaul, etc.). 
Thus, the adverse effect depends on the maintainability characteristics of the equipment. Maintainability rep-
resents the capability of the equipment or systems to be maintained under specified conditions during a given 
period, which depends to some extent on their physical characteristics or design among other factors, such as 
maintenance task force, spare parts, etc. 
3.2 Efficiency of surveillance requirements 
Surveillance requirements involves periodic tests, e.g. monthly or quarterly. A Test interval is established. 
The primary purpose of testing is to assure that equipment of safety systems normally in standby will be 
operable when needed in case of accident. By testing equipment, failures can be detected that may have 
occurred since the last test or the time when the equipment was last known to be operational. Then, positive 
effect of testing is its capability to detect hidden failures and this way limiting the risk of undetected 
downtimes of the safety component, i.e. the “test-limited” risk, which depends on not only the equipment 
unreliability characteristics, i.e. equipment failure rate, and the Surveillance Frequency (SF), i.e. test interval, 
but also on the effectiveness of testing, i.e. the capability of the test to cover only a fraction of hidden failures. 
On the contrary, some tests may have an adverse impact on safety because of their undesirable effects, i.e. 
“test-caused” risk, such as, for example, test errors causing plant transients, wear out of equipment due to 
testing, etc. Often, a very important adverse effect is the one called the detected downtime effect that 
represents the time the equipment is out of service for testing. Thus, this adverse effect depends on the testing 
characteristics of the equipment. In general, the undesirable effects will be reduced if the SF is decreased, 
because then fewer tests will be conducted. By reducing the SF we also can obtain the additional benefit of 
reducing resources on testing. However, an important disadvantage here is that the fault-exposure time, i.e. 
the time during which the component will be subject to hidden failures during standby, will correspondingly 
increase as the SF decreases, i.e. the positive effect of the test limiting risk of undetected downtimes is 
reduced as well.  
NPP safety systems consist of a number of redundant and diverse trains, each one consisting of highly 
reliable equipment, normally in standby, which must perform the intended safety function. Test Strategy 
establishes the grouping of equipment undertaken the test simultaneously, e.g. a full train, and the scheduling 
of the tests of the several groups, each group consisting of equipment in one of the redundant trains. 
Normally, the same SF applies to equipment of the redundant trains. However, the test-limited risk will 
depend on the relative scheduling of the tests of the redundant trains, i.e. the test strategy. Often, standard 
PSA quantification of the test-limited risk assumes that the relative test times of redundant components follow 
no specific schedule and are randomly placed with regard to one another. By staggering the test times of the 
components in different trains, then the test-limited risk will be reduced for the same SF as compared to the 
independent PSA assumption.  
3.3 NPP programs for improving effectiveness of maintenance and surveillance requirements 
Ref. [17] introduces ongoing programs and others being considered for implementation at NPPs. They can be 
grouped into two different groups, one that focuses on the improvement of licensing basis and the other that 
focuses on the improvement of maintenance activities. The first group includes Risk Informed Technical 
Specifications programs, which focuses on the improvement of Technical Specifications requirements such as 
Surveillance Testing Requirements and Completion Times. Other programs in this group focus on Risk-
Informed In-Service Inspection and Risk-Informed In-Service Testing following the same principles of the 
Risk Informed Decision Making philosophy proposed in RG 1.174. The second group of programs focuses on 
the improvement of the asset management and maintenance policy. A common objective of these programs is 
to reach and maintain a high intrinsic reliability target, reducing as much as possible the failure rate, which is 
of most relevance for SSCs important to NPP safety. This is one of the main purposes for implementing a Re-
liability Centered Maintenance program. Other programs in this group focus on Maintenance Rule Implemen-
tation, Life Management of SSC and License Renewal of NPP. 
A common objective of all these programs is to allow reaching and keeping the most reliable, available and 
safe operation of NPP along it design life and beyond, if required, by means of implementing high effective-
ness maintenance and testing activities. Effective maintenance programs and surveillance requirements are 
essential for ensuring acceptable equipment reliability and safe operation of ageing NPP along their service 
life; both design life and extended life for long-term operation. To ensure effectiveness of maintenance and 
testing programs, they should be periodically reviewed and modified based on operating experience and pref-
erably making decisions based on their risk impact. Consequently, Ageing PSA modelling and data must be 
developed and updated taking into account explicitly the results of the implementation of such programs as 
they influence maintenance and testing effectiveness and this way they have a large influence on the evalua-
tion of equipment reliability and NPP risk profiles over time [8, 9]. 
4 RELIABILITY MODELLING ADDRESING EFFECTIVENESS OF MAINTENANCE AND 
TESTING  
4.1 Failure rate model 
Traditionally, standard PSA of NPP assumes constant failure rate to modelling the reliability of components 
normally in standby 
0λλ(t)  . (1) 
In Ageing PSA, failure rate models must be formulated using age-dependent models, i.e. component relia-
bility depends on its age, to account for the effect of component ageing. Different models of age-dependent 
reliability of components have been proposed in the literature [8-9, 18, 22-23]. 
The selection of the most adequate reliability model depends on aspects such as component type, its opera-
tional mode, the ageing mechanisms considered and maintenance and surveillance testing programs applied. 
As introduced in the previous section, effectiveness of maintenance programs and surveillance requirements 
are essential for ensuring acceptable component operational reliability and safe operation of nuclear power 
plants along their service life; both design life and extended life for long-term operation. Consequently, the 
reliability of the component should be modelled as a function of the inherent reliability of the component, i.e. 
component failure rate imposed by design, the component ageing, which degrades the inherent reliability, and 
the effectiveness of maintenance activities, which improve the reliability degraded by ageing, i.e. there is an 
attempt to return component reliability back to its inherent value eventually, but normally impossible, in case 
of perfect maintenance activities. In addition, the effectiveness of testing in relation to testing coverage of 
failure mechanism has to be taken into account also. 
The following sections introduce a kind of age-dependent reliability model which address explicitly the ef-
fectiveness of maintenance and testing. 
4.2 Age-dependent failure rate model addressing imperfect maintenance  
As proposed in [18, 19], it is supposed the age of a component, w(t), evolves with chronological time, t. In 
addition, the effect of maintenance on the age of the component and on its reliability is included based on a 
model of imperfect maintenance. Imperfect maintenance models consider that each maintenance activity re-
duces the age of the component by some degree, depending on its effectiveness. 
Among the different models of imperfect maintenance that can be found in the literature, this paper consid-
ers the Proportional Age Reduction (PAR) model and the Proportional Age Setback (PAS) model proposed in 
above Refs. [18, 19]. The selection of the most appropriate model in each case depends on the component 
type, failure mechanism and sort of maintenance activity. 
4.2.1 Proportional Age Reduction based ageing and reliability models 
In the PAR approach, each maintenance activity is assumed to reduce proportionally the component age 
gained from the previous maintenance. In this model, the effect of maintenance is introduced by using an ef-
fectiveness parameterranging in the interval [0, 1].  
Assuming the time a component is out of service for maintenance is negligible as compared to the time be-
tween two consecutive maintenance activities, the evolution of the age of the component in the period m+1, 
between m and m +1 maintenance activities, is given in general by [18]: 
)t(tw(t)w mmm 

1   (2) 
where 

mw   is the age of the component immediately after maintenance number m, t is the chronological 
time elapsed since the component was installed and tm is the time at which the m-maintenance activity is per-
formed.  
Under the PAR model, the age of the component in the period between maintenance activities m and m+1 
is given particularizing eqn. (2) to yield the following expression [18]:  
mm ε ∙ tt(t)w 1  (3) 
In the literature, one can find different component reliability models proposed to address the effect of 
equipment ageing, such as linear model, Exponential, Weibull, etc [8]. In this paper, the linear ageing failure 
rate model has been considered, being this the simplest age-dependent reliability model [19]. This model as-
sumes that the failure rate has a linear behaviour with component age departing form an initial reliability, in-
herently by design, which can be expressed as [9, 19]: 
w(t)αλλ(w(t))  0  (4) 
where t represents the chronological time,  is the linear ageing factor and w(t) is the component’s age 
given by eqn. (3) after maintenance m+1, which depends on the effectiveness of the maintenance policy ap-
plied on the component. In eqn. (4) component inherent failure rate by design is given by the term λ0, which 
represents random failures, while the second term )(tw  represents the degradation of the equipment failure 
rate due to equipment ageing, which is counterbalanced by the effectiveness of the maintenance policy. 
Substituting eqn. (3) into eqn. (4), the component age-dependent failure rate model is obtained under the 
PAR imperfect maintenance model after m-maintenance as follow:  
)tε(tαλ(t))λ(w(t)λ mmm   011  (5) 
Then, an average ageing failure rate, m+1, over the period between two consecutive maintenance activi-
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1   (7) 
Eqn. (7) represents an averaged ageing failure rate between two consecutive maintenance activities, m and 
m+1, which includes the effect of ageing using a linear ageing model () and the effect of the maintenance 
performed on the component modelled as a PAR model with constant maintenance effectiveness (). In addi-
tion, M represents a constant periodicity between maintenance activities, normally time-directed preventive 
maintenance.  
4.2.2 Proportional Age Setback based ageing and reliability models 
In the PAS approach, each maintenance activity is assumed to shift the origin of time from which the age of 
the component is evaluated. Thus, the PAS model considers that the maintenance activity reduces proportion-
ally, in a factor of  the age that the component has immediately before it enters maintenance, where the 
maintenance effectiveness parameter ranges in [0, 1].  
Again, assuming the time a component is out of service for maintenance is negligible as compared to the 
time between two consecutive maintenance activities, the evolution of the age of the component in the period 
m+1, between m and m +1 maintenance activities, is given by the following equation under the PAS model 
[17]: 
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Again, the linear ageing failure rate model has been considered. Then, substituting eqn. (8) into eqn. (4), 
the component ageing failure rate model is obtained under the PAS imperfect maintenance model after m-
maintenance as follow:  
)())(()( 011 mmm wttwt     (10) 
Then, an average ageing failure rate, m+1, over the period between two consecutive maintenance activi-
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Eqn. (11) represents an average ageing failure rate between two consecutive maintenance activities, m and 
m+1, which includes the effect of the ageing using a linear ageing model () and the effect of the mainte-
nance performed on the component modelled as a PAS model with constant maintenance effectiveness (). In 
addition, M represents a constant periodicity between preventive maintenance activities and wm is given by 
eqn. (9). 
Based on the results found in [18], there is an asymptotic behaviour of the PAS model, then, eqn. (11) has 
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4.3 Age-dependent failure rate model incorporating effectiveness of maintenance types 
As introduced in section 3, one can find several types of maintenance activities with an aim to assess, im-
prove or restore component operational capability. Consequently, the maintenance effectiveness depends on 
the particular maintenance type being considered in each case. 
In a corrective maintenance (CM) activity only the operational capability of the failed component failed is 
restored. Thus, it is often assumed that the age of the component after CM is exactly the same than that im-
mediately before entering CM, which means that the model of imperfect maintenance introduced in the previ-
ous section reduces to an "as Bad As Old (BAO)" model where the effectiveness of CM is assumed to be = 
0. 
On the opposite case, in an overhaul maintenance (OM) the component is replaced by a new one. Thus, it is 
often assumed that the age of the component after OM resets to zero, which means that the model of imper-
fect maintenance introduced in the previous section reduces to an "as Good As New (GAN)" model where the 
effectiveness of OM is assumed to be = 1.  
Last, preventive maintenance (PM) increases the intrinsic reliability of a non-failed component beyond the 
natural reliability, for example, controlling its degradation below the failure point. Thus, it is often assumed 
that the age of the component after PM is reduced as compared to that immediately before entering PM but 
without falling to zero. This means the model of imperfect maintenance introduced in the previous sections 
applies somewhere between BAO and GAN models, where ranges in interval ]0, 1[. 
4.4 Age-dependent failure rate model addressing test efficiency  
By testing, component failures can be detected that may have occurred since the last test or the time when the 
component was last known to be operational. The main objective of surveillance test is to detect hidden fail-
ures so that the component can be restored to its operational state, normally BAO state by performing CM af-
ter the test has detected a failure. A surveillance test is modelled here as allowing to assure to some extent; 
which depends on the test efficiency, that the component is operational, but without changing its age. Conse-
quently, in reliability terminology, the surveillance test intervals are called BAO intervals since the compo-
nent age coming out of the test is basically the same as the component age going into the test, i.e. the compo-
nent is as old with regard to its age [8]. 
As introduced in the previous paragraph, test efficiency has to be taken into account. For example, as pro-
posed in Ref. [20], it can be seen like a testing coverage of failure mechanisms, where coverage is defined as 
a share of detected an undetected failures by testing. Thus, test efficiency can be formulated in terms of the 
percentage of the total failure rate that is detected, i.e. covered, by testing, called also testing coverage. Alter-
natively, Ref. [9] defines test efficiency like the probability that a given failure is detected by the test.  
In both previous cases, test efficiency can be represented by a single parameter . Ref. [9] and [21] give 
values of for test efficiency of several component types. As a result, the consideration of a test efficiency 
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where the test efficiencyranges in the interval [0, 1]. In eqn. (13), the first contribution represents the age-
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On the other hand, a large number of critical components overtakes functional tests mostly performed dur-
ing refuelling of NPP, where the refuelling Interval (RI) ranges between 12 and 24 months, so that typically 
RI could be set equal to 18 months. The functional test often involves testing full performance of the compo-
nent capacity, so that it performs very close to real conditions in case of emergency. Then, the efficiency of 
such a functional test should be very close to one in detecting hidden failures. Similarly to the surveillance 
tests, in reliability terminology, the functional test intervals (often adopting the RI) are called BAO intervals 
since the component age coming out of the test is basically the same as the component age going into the 
functional test, i.e. the component is as old with regard to its age. 
Thus, critical components for NPP safety may overtake at least two tests: one surveillance test and another 
functional test. Consequently, to address such a second or refuelling functional test, the undetected age-
dependent failure rate, given by eqn. (15), should split into two new contributions: detected and undetected 
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where the test efficiency of the  refuelling functional testRranges also in the interval [0, 1], but very close 
to one now. In addition, eqn. (16) represents the age-depended failure rate contribution associated with de-
tected failures only after the refuelling functional test, while eqn. (17) represents the age-dependent failure 
rate contribution associated with failures that remain undetected even after the refuelling functional test. 
The formulation proposed in eqns. (13) to (17) can accommodate a number of assumptions made in stand-
ard PSA. For example, sometimes only the functional test is considered in standard PSA, which represents a 
conservative assumption where it is assumed implicitly that  is set equal to 0 while R is set equal to 1. Al-
ternatively, when only surveillance testing is considered it is assumed implicitly that R is set equal to 0. 
Care should be taken in this situation since in such a case it is often assumed at the same time that  is set 
equal to 1, which is not a conservative assumption always. Therefore, as a general case, both contributions 
should be addressed as proposed in the following section. 
5 UNAVAILABILITY MODELLING  
As introduced above, Surveillance Requirement involves periodic tests, e.g. monthly or quarterly, with posi-
tive and negative effects [5]. The positive effect of testing is its capability to detect hidden failures and this 
way limiting the risk of undetected downtimes of the safety component, i.e. the “test-limited” risk, which de-
pends on the equipment reliability, i.e. equipment failure rate, test efficiency, etc (see section 4.4) . Often, a 
very important adverse effect of testing, to be considered at the minimum, is the one called the detected 
downtime effect that represents the time the equipment is out of service for testing, i.e. “test-caused” risk. 
Thus, this adverse effect depends on the testing characteristics of the equipment. Note this adverse effect only 
applies for surveillance tests, while it does not apply for functional tests performed during refuelling of the 
NPP. 
On the other hand, in order to consider thoroughly the risk impact of maintenance, there is a need to con-
sider not only its impact on component reliability (see sections 4.2 and 4.3) but also those component una-
vailability contributions related with equipment downtimes for maintenance, i.e. preventive maintenance, cor-
rective maintenance, overhaul, etc., provided that they are not performed during refuelling of the NPP. 
In summary, the unavailability contributions of a component normally in stand-by are divided into two cat-
egories: a) unavailability due to failures, i.e. unreliability effect, and b) unavailability due to testing and 
maintenance downtimes, named the downtime effect. 
5.1 Unreliability contributions 
Adopting the basis of the formulation of unreliability contributions in Refs. [18, 19] but addressing now the 
several age-dependent failure rate contributions introduced in section 4.4, the component unavailability due to 
unreliability contributions can be evaluated using the following equations : 
TIλu Dm
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where m+1 represents the unavailability contributions are evaluated between maintenance activities m and 
m+1, uDm+1 is the unreliability contribution due to detected failures by surveillance testing, uUDm+1 is the unre-
liability contribution due to undetected failures by surveillance testing that are then detected by a second 
functional tests and uUUm+1 is the unreliability contribution due to undetected failures by both surveillance and 
functional tests. In addition, the following notation has been used: 
 = cyclic or per-demand failure probability, 
Dm+1 = detected fraction of age-dependent stand-by failure rate (section 4.4), 
UDm+1 = undetected fraction of age-dependent stand-by failure rate that is then detected (section 4.4), 
UUm+1 = undetected fraction of age-dependent stand-by failure rate that remains undetected (section 4.4), 
TI = surveillance test interval, 
RI = functional test interval (considered herein equal to RI, refuelling interval) 
L = life of the component.  
 
What concerns parameter L, it represents the component life as compared to the NPP design life. In case 
the component is not replaced by a new one over the NPP design life, then this parameter should be equal to 
the NPP design life. In case the component undertakes only time-directed overhaul maintenance, this parame-
ter L should be equal to a constant replacement period. Last, in case of the component being replaced based 
on its condition, e.g. failure rate going beyond a given threshold limit, this parameter L should be equal to the 
component residual life.  
5.2 Downtime contributions 
Based on Refs. [18, 19] but addressing now only the age-dependent failure rate contribution corresponding to 
detected and repaired failures with the plant at power, as introduced in section 4.4, the component unavaila-



















where m+1 represents the unavailability contributions are evaluated between maintenance activities m and 
m+1, uTm+1 represents the unavailability contribution due to testing, uMm+1 is the unavailability contribution 
due to performing preventive maintenance, uCm+1 is the unavailability contribution due to performing correc-
tive maintenance, and uOm+1 is the contribution due to replacement of the equipment, if any. In addition, the 
following new notation has been used: 
τ = downtime for testing, 
σ= downtime for preventive maintenance, 
M = the period to perform time-directed preventive maintenance,  
 = downtime for repair when there are no time limitations on conducting such a repair, 
 = downtime for replacement, and 
6 RISK MODELLING  
There are different approaches that can be used for transforming a standard PSA to an age dependent PSA, or 
an APSA. Ref. [9] introduces three basic approaches. Herein, only two are introduced. 
The first approach involves carrying out a standard PSA evaluation a number of times with different com-
ponent failure rates used in each evaluation. The different component failure rates which are used are step-
wise approximations to time dependent component failure rates. This approach is straightforward, but the age 
of each component cannot be separately tracked. Hence, the effect of testing, maintenance, or repair on the 
age of the component or on the ageing rate cannot be explicitly modelled. This is the approach adopted when 
using a Living PSA. 
The second approach for transforming a PSA into an APSA is to substitute age dependent component relia-
bility and unavailability models into the PSA quantification formulas. The fundamental PSA formulas for the 
Core Damage Frequency, CDF, in terms of the component failure probabilities and component unavailabili-
ties are still used. However, the quantification formulas for the component failure probabilities and compo-
nent unavailabilities are changed from the usual, steady state formulas, to those which explicitly incorporate 
ageing as is described in sections 4 and 5. This approach efficiently calculates the CDF and system unavaila-
bilities as a function of plant age addressing explicitly the effects of maintenance and testing. This is the ap-
proach adopted in this paper. 
Using a level 1 PSA, the corresponding risk metric for the evaluation of ageing is the annual average base-
line CDF considering the effect component ageing, which can be re-formulated for a single component i using 
the law of the total probability as follows: 
  iiiiiii   B  u   CDF  CDFCDF  uCDFCDF  0010  (25) 
where ui [-] represents the average unavailability of a given component i, CDFi1 [year-1] represents the in-
creased risk with the component i down, and CDFi0 [year-1] represents the reduced risk when the component i 
is known not to be down, as compared both with the baseline risk, CDF [year-1]. Thus, age-dependent una-
vailability ui can be formulated by adding eqns. (18) to (24). In addition, Bi corresponds to the traditional 
Birnbaum importance measure of component i. 
On the other hand, RG 1.174 establishes two risk metrics for evaluating the risk impact of whatever change 
to the licensing basis [5], which are herein adapted to address the risk impact of equipment ageing in the ex-
ample of application. Using a level 1 PSA, the required risk metrics for the evaluation of risk impact of age-
ing would be the annual average baseline CDF before ageing (named herein CDFb) and the change in the an-
nual average baseline CDF due to equipment ageing, which can be formulated as follows: 
be CDFCDFΔCDF 
 (26) 
where CDFb and CDFe are the CDF at the beginning (b) and at the end (e) of a given period where the ageing 
effect is considered, respectively. Eqn. (26) can be particularized for the case of the single component i by 
substituting eqn. (25) into eqn. (26) that yields: 







where uib and uie are the average unavailability ui of the component i at the beginning (b) and at the end (e) of 
a given period considering the ageing effect, respectively. Thus, uib and uie can be formulated by adding eqns. 
(18) to (24).  
It should be noted that the age-dependent core damage frequencies, CDFb and CDFe, are obtained using the 
level 1 APSA. CDFe will increase significantly due to cumulative ageing of several relevant components [8]. 
Therefore, the age-related unavailability contributions should be addressed at least for relevant components in 
the resulting Ageing-PSA. 
As proposed in [12], the results of importance analysis performed for system components of the NPP, based 
on Fussell-Vesely importance measure, can be used to select the most critical components for ageing. Thus, it 
allows showing how the importance profile of components may drastically change due to ageing. Using eqn. 
(25), the Fussell-Vesely measure for component i can be formulated as follows: 
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Eqn (29) shows the importance of component i for the CDF depends on its unavailability, ui, and it 
functional/structural importance, Bi. Since ui changes with component’s ageing, then its importance changes 
over NPP age too. Therefore, the importance profile of components will change according to the different 
ageing rates of the several components in a NPP. Fussell-Vesely importance measure can help in identifying 
the most critical components from those more affected by ageing, formulated as follows: 
ΔCDF 
   BΔu
   
ΔCDF 
 ΔCDF
     FV iiiΔCDFi

  (30) 
Despite of the interest of including the n most critical components for NPP ageing into the formulation of 
the CDF, the scope of the example of application has been limited to better focus only on a single critical 
component as it is the simplest way to demonstrate the importance of addressing the effectiveness of 
maintenance and testing to evaluate the risk impact of equipment ageing. 
7 APPLICATION CASE 
7.1 Problem description 
This section presents a simple example of application that focusses on analysing the risk impact of ageing of a 
single critical component of a NPP depending on several maintenance and surveillance alternatives along the 
last ten years of a NPP design life.  
A motor-operated valve (MOV) of the Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS) has been selected based on 
several arguments. This valve is normally open and its function is to control the flow from AFWS until Steam 
Generators on the secondary of a typical Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) NPP. First, the basic event repre-
senting MOV “fails to remain open” is one of the most important contributors to the CDF based on Fussell-
Vesely importance measure and using the standard PSA available. This basic event is modelled as a standby-
related failure. Second, aging, maintenance, surveillance testing and functional test are meaningful for this 
MOV.  
7.2 Risk modelling and data 
A level 1 standard PSA at power considering only internal events is available, which allows obtaining CDF 
risk metric. The level 1 PSA used has been developed at component level, so that, the level of detail is appro-
priate to support the analysis of component ageing addressing effectiveness of maintenance and testing. How-
ever, there has been a need of refining the level 1 PSA modelling to address equipment ageing, i.e. to obtain 
the APSA, by replacing the standard failure rates and equipment unreliability and unavailability models by 
the new ones proposed in sections 4 and 5. 
For sake of simplicity in the problem formulation and discussion of results, only the MOV of the AFWS is 
considered in order to formulate the APSA for this simple example of application. Table 1 shows data used 
for modelling the MOV basic event into the level 1 APSA for each Case considered within the sensitivity 
study performed. This table includes the description of parameters and corresponding constant value or prob-
ability distribution function (pdf). In the same way as in the standard PSA, all variables except of motor-
operated failure rate have been considered constant, i.e. mean values have been used. MOV failure rate has 
been modelled as a random variable assuming a Gamma probability distribution function.  
In Table 1, the value of the linear ageing factor () has been obtained from a generic database, which is 
known as TIRGALEX [21]. TIRGALEX considers that the value of in the case of motor-operated valves is 
equal to 4.11·10-11 h-2. This value remains the same for Cases 1 to 7. 
 
Table 1. Models and data used for representing the MOV basic event into the level 1 APSA for each Case 
 
In Table 1, one can find two groups of sensitivity cases. The first one consists of evaluating and comparing 
the risk impact of different Ageing-PSA models used actually in the context of incorporating ageing (without 
or with consideration of maintenance and test effectiveness) into standard PSAs (Case 1 to 3). Second one 
considers some sensitivity analysis cases to observe the effect of different testing and maintenance strategies 
on risk level, i.e. changing intervals and effectiveness (Case 4 to 7).  
The first data are given for the original case, which considers the “current standard PSA”, in which con-
stant failure rate is used. Usually this value is updated on a regular basis at NPP to reflect the current design 
and operational features of the NPP over its design life, which is commonly known as Living-PSA. Therefore, 
adoption of standard PSA models and data does not addresses explicitly neither the effect that equipment age-
ing nor maintenance and testing effectiveness could have on the conclusions drawn from PSA studies and ap-
plications based on the analysis of the risk impact. As shown in Table 1, a test activity performed every plant 
shutdown with efficiency set to one is considered (TI=4616 hours, which represents the mean time between 
plant shutdowns that is normally shorter than the  refuelling period). 
Case 1 takes into account the effect of component ageing, where asset management is addressed only im-
plicitly into the ageing failure rate. Therefore, effectiveness of maintenance activities is not considered explic-
itly. Again, in this Case 1 only the test activity performed every plant shutdown with efficiency set to one is 
considered. 
Case 2 extend the previous case to take into account also the effect of maintenance effectiveness explicitly. 
It is assumed a Proportional Age Reduction (PAR) model to represent the evolution of component age and re-
liability as a consequence of the time-directed preventive maintenance policy. A maintenance interval equal 
to 13140 hours has been stablished with maintenance effectiveness equal to 0,6. Again, the same test activity 
performed every plant shutdown with efficiency set to one is considered. This approach of ageing modelling 
is often used in the literature [22-23]. 
Simultaneous planning of both effective maintenance and efficient testing activities are necessary in order 
to allow timely mitigation and correction of detected active ageing effects and degradation as introduced in 
the previous sections. Case 3 has been formulated based on full development of models and parameters 
showed in sections 4 and 5. As cited in the previous sections, test efficiency is an important parameter be-
cause it splits the total age-dependent failure rate into two age-dependent failure rate modes: detected and un-
detected. The maintenance and testing data used in Case 3 has been obtained from literature data concerning 
equipment of similar characteristics in a typical Pressurized Water Reactor [8-9, 21]. Thus, in this case, two 
types of tests have been considered. The first one is a surveillance test with a Test interval (TI) and efficiency 
(), which consists of a service inspection for this valve being performed regularly every 3 months with the 
NPP at power. The second one is a functional test performed every refuelling period, which is represented by 
the  refuelling Interval (RI) and efficiency (R). Both tests are imposed by current Surveillance Requirements 
in the Technical Specifications for this MOV belonging to the AFWS. Moreover, as in the previous case time-
directed preventive maintenance with periodicity M equal to 13140 and corresponding effectiveness  equal 
to  have been considered. 
Departing from this Case 3, a number of sensitivity analyses have been performed with an aim at demon-
strating the risk impact of alternative maintenance and testing strategies (Case 4 to 7). Thus, Cases 4 and 5 
focus on the effect of reducing the maintenance interval and improving the maintenance effectiveness, respec-
tively. Cases 6 and 7 focus on the effect of reducing the test interval and improving its efficiency, respective-
ly. 
7.3 Assessment of risk impact 
In this section, the CDF has been obtained using the standard PSA and using the APSA under different alter-
natives (Case 1 to Case 7) by adopting the corresponding data shown in Table 1 for each case. Thus, CDFb 
and CDF have been obtained using eqn. (25) and eqn. (26) as proposed in section 6. Table 2 provides the re-
sults for each case. It shows CDFb, which corresponds to the CDF at the beginning of the assessed period. In 
addition, Table 2 summarizes also the results for CDFe, which correspond to the CDF at the end of the as-
sessed period without or with consideration of ageing and effectiveness of testing and maintenance activities 







Table 2. Results of CFD and CDF for each Case (10 years period considered) 
7.4 Analysis of risk impact 
In this section, risk assessment results are compared against acceptance guidelines in RG 1.174. Couples of 
values {CDFb, CDF} are used to evaluate the risk impact of equipment ageing for each Case. 
According to RG 1.174, the appropriate numerical measures to use in the comparison of the PSA results to 
the acceptance guidelines are mean values. Those mean values refer to the means of the probability distribu-
tions that result from the propagation of the uncertainties on the input parameters and those model uncertain-
ties explicitly represented in the model (middle point for each couple in Figures 1 and 2). 
The analysis of the results in this section has been divided into two parts. The first one is devoted to com-
pare the results of the evaluation of risk impact of component ageing using the standard PSA and the different 
approaches for Ageing-PSA discussed in this work (Case 1 to 3). Figure 1 presents the results of such com-
parison.  
In Figure 1, one can observe couples {CDFb, CDF} for each case, Standard PSA and Ageing-PSA (Case 1 
to 3). As expected, Standard PSA cannot capture the effect of component ageing, so it remains at the bottom 
line where CDF equals to zero. On the contrary, Case 1 to 3 are located in Region II according to RG 1.174. 
Case 3 is the reference case in this study as it adopts the Ageing-PSA approach proposed in this paper, which 
addresses explicitly and simultaneously the impact of component ageing, maintenance effectiveness and test 
efficiency. Case 1 address component ageing but it does not address neither maintenance effectiveness nor 
test efficiency and consequently it overestimate the risk impact of component ageing, CDF. On the contrary, 
Case 2 considers both equipment ageing and maintenance effectiveness explicitly, but it does not account for 




Figure 1: Evaluation on risk impact of ageing depending on the APSA model used (A=Ageing, 
ME=Maintenance Effectiveness, TE=Test Efficiency) 
 
As introduced above, Case 1 to 3 are located in Region II according to RG 1.174 (see Figure 1). In this re-
gion, as established in this Regulatory Guide, improvements should be given in order to move the couple 
from this region to Region III (acceptable). Therefore, it may seem appropriate to implement some kind of 
compensatory measure for ageing management, for example, adopting improved maintenance and testing 
strategies. 
This way, the second part of this study adopts the Ageing-PSA approach proposed in this paper (Case 3). It 
presents the results of sensitivity analysis cases developed using this approach in order to show it is possible 
to assess explicitly the risk impact of component ageing depending on alternative testing and the maintenance 
strategies (Case 4 to 7), which could be used in the framework of risk informed decision making (RIDM) on 
changes to testing and maintenance policies.  
A key aspect of NPP life management in a RIDM context is to evaluate the risk impact of existing mainte-
nance and testing programs in managing ageing of systems, structures and components. Eventually, if com-
pensatory measures are necessary to managing ageing in an appropriate way, it should include also assess-
ment of the effectiveness of managing equipment ageing by adopting alternative maintenance management 
programs and/or reformulation of current operational requirements such as surveillance requirements. In this 
context, four sensitivity analysis cases are presented in this work (Case 4 to 7), each focused on improving 




Figure 2. Sensitivity analysis to Case # {M, , TI,   
 
 
Case 4 and Case 5 are focused on analysing the risk impact of component ageing departing from the refer-
ence case (Case 3) and introducing some changes in current maintenance policy, i.e. by reducing maintenance 
interval (Case 4) and by increasing maintenance effectiveness (Case 5), respectively. In Case 4, the mainte-
nance interval, M, is reduced from 13140 hours to 4320 hours while other parameters keep at the same values 
as for Case 3. One can observe in Figure 2 the risk impact of component ageing, CDF, for this case is re-
duced. In Case 5, the maintenance effectiveness is increased as compared to Case 3 while other parameters 
keep constant at the same values. One can observe in Figure 2 the risk impact of component ageing decreases 
significantly moving the couple {CDFb, CDF} to acceptable region (Region III). 
Current Technical Specifications impose surveillance testing of this MOV every 2160 hours (approximate-
ly three months). Case 6 and Case 7 focus on analysing the risk impact of component ageing departing from 
the reference case (Case 3) and introducing some changes in current testing policy, i.e. by reducing test inter-
val (Case 6) and by increasing test efficiency (Case 7), respectively. In Case 6, the test interval is reduced 
from 2160 hours to 720 hours, while the functional test and other parameters remains the same values as for 
the reference case (Case 3). In Figure 2, one can observe the risk impact of component ageing, CDF, for this 
case is reduced slightly. In Case 7, test efficiency is increased from 0,6 to 0,9. As one can observed in the 
Figure 2, the reduction of CDF is more significant now as compared with the one observed for Case 6 mov-
ing the couple {CDFb, CDF} to the acceptable region (Region III).  
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper presents a new approach to Ageing PSA (APSA) modelling to be considered in the framework of 
the Risk Informed Decision Making according to R.G. 1.174, which is intended to be used to support risk-
informed decisions on the effectiveness of asset management programs and technical specification require-
ments of critical equipment of Nuclear Power Plants (NPP). This APSA can help in performing the Periodic 
Safety Review to support risk-informed decisions required to obtain approval from the regulatory body for 
continuing NPP operation. This APSA incorporates not only equipment ageing but also maintenance and sur-
veillance testing requirements explicitly into APSA models and data as compared to standard PSA.  
The CDF evaluation has been developed using age-dependent reliability, availability and risk models and 
data of a typical PWR, which allows obtaining results that are more realistic. The results are analysed in the 
framework of risk-informed decision-making established in RG 1.174. Thus, the results obtained from the dif-
ferent cases of application show how the risk impact of ageing depends on not only ageing of critical equip-
ment but also on maintenance and testing practices. This way, the APSA allows addressing explicitly the role 
of compensatory measures to component ageing in terms of improved maintenance programs and changes on 
surveillance requirements, which allows satisfying safety criteria as imposed by current NPP regulation with-
in this framework.  
Finally, this paper presents a preliminary study in which only one critical component has been considered 
into the APSA. Future work should consider at least all critical components and use plant-specific ageing data 
in order to obtain plant-specific robust results, while allowing to consider the aggregate effect of ageing and 
maintenance and testing programs. Note sensitivity analyses have shown the risk impact depends largely on 
the model parameters, such as ageing factor, maintenance effectiveness, test efficiency and so one. Thus, data 
for support of ageing PSA is difficult to be obtained and significant uncertainty may be involved in the results 
as a consequence of the uncertainty behind estimation of ageing rate, maintenance effectiveness and test effi-
ciency. Then, plant-specific data should be used to the extent possible in order to reduce uncertainty in quan-
tifying the risk impact of component ageing. 
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Figure 1: Evaluation on risk impact of ageing depending on the APSA model used (A=Ageing, 
















∆CDF vs CDF Case 3 {13140; 0,6; 2160; 0,6}
Case 4 {4320; 0,6; 2160; 0,6}
Case 5 {13140; 0,9; 2160; 0,6}
Case 6 {13140; 0,6; 720; 0,6}






Figure 2. Sensitivity analysis to Case # {M, , TI,   
 
Table 1. Models and data used for representing the MOV basic event into the level 1 APSA for each Case 
 


































constant No No 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,9 0,6 0,6 
TI (h) Test Interval constant 4616 4616 4616 2160 2160 2160 720 2160 




constant No No No 13140 13140 13140 13140 13140 
R
Test effi-
ciency of the 
functional 
test 
constant No No No 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 2. Results of CFD and CDF for each Case (10 years period considered) 
 
  
CDFb (year-1) CDFe (year-1) ACDF = CDFe - CDFb (10 years) 
Mean  5% Perc. 95% Perc. Mean  5% Perc. 95% Perc. Mean  5% Perc. 95% Perc. 
Standard PSA 9,42E-06 3,44E-06 2,17E-05 9,42E-06 3,44E-06 2,17E-05 - - - 
Case 1 1,20E-05 4,88E-06 2,60E-05 1,64E-05 6,35E-06 3,65E-06 3,35E-06 1,24E-06 7,44E-06 
Case 2 9,65E-06 3,36E-06 2,29E-05 1,10E-05 3,68E-06 2,50E-05 1,20E-06 4,04E-07 2,84E-06 
Case 3 1,08E-05 3,24E-06 2,60E-05 1,24E-05 3,71E-06 2,86E-05 1,76E-06 5,63E-07 4,05E-06 
Case 4 9,34E-06 3,28E-06 2,04E-05 1,04E-05 3,69E-06 2,25E-05 1,08E-06 3,62E-07 2,24E-06 
Case 5 1,03E-05 3,68E-06 2,43E-05 1,11E-05 3,56E-06 2,67E-05 4,53E-07 1,13E-07 1,13E-06 
Case 6 9,36E-06 3,34E-06 1,80E-05 1,19E-05 4,06E-06 3,01E-05 1,51E-06 5,45E-07 3,40E-06 
Case 7 9,28E-06 3,31E-06 2,11E-05 1,03E-05 3,71E-06 2,46E-05 8,20E-07 2,98E-07 1,75E-06 
 
